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Philosophy and Theology

Is later abortion worse than early abortion? Would the discovery of a nonhuman
rational animal change the personhood debate? Does an individual person arise
only after the possibility of twinning is excluded? This reflection touches on these
important questions.
Late versus Early Abortion
In a fascinating article, “Late- vs. Early-Term Abortion: A Thomistic Analysis”
(The Thomist, January 2007), Andrew J. Peach argues that
the moral intuition that late-term abortions are more seriously wrong than
earlier-term ones can be accounted for in a different way from the ways proposed
by apologists for abortion. Defenders of abortion, it will be remembered, typi
cally resort to a gradualist or achievement account of personhood in order to
accommodate this intuition. On these accounts, late-term abortions are worse
than earlier ones because the moral status of the fetus changes throughout or
during pregnancy. However, by showing how circumstances affect the gravity
of a human action and the culpability of a moral agent, one can account for
the differences between early- and late-term abortions without compromising
the conviction that all abortions are acts of murder and inherently wrong. One
need not resort to a dubious account of personhood in order to account for this
moral intuition. (139)

One way of accounting for the intuition is the additional evil of inflicting pain in
late-term abortions but not in early-term abortions: “A murder that involves pain is,
in itself, more grievous than one that does not. An abortion that is performed after
the fetus is capable of feeling pain is, for that very reason, more seriously wrong
than an abortion that is performed prior to the onset of this capacity. The infliction
of pain need not enter into the act of murder, but when it does, it renders the act more
grievous ‘by multiplying the ratio of evil,’ to use Thomas’s phrase” (126).
Of course, it is possible to remove this difference by simply anesthetizing the
human fetus prior to a late-term abortion procedure, but in second- or third-trimester
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abortions as typically performed, this difference remains. Others might object that
even the early fetus experiences pain, but the typical advocate of abortion denies
this, so Peach’s argument would work at least dialectically on his opponent’s sup
position. In any case, it is certainly true that some killing of early human life (say,
killing embryos for research purposes) would involve no fetal or embryonic pain and
therefore would be distinguishable from other forms of killing (partial-birth abortion)
that, as typically performed, involve pain in a normal human fetus.
Second, there is ceteris paribus a difference in the effort required to sustain
fetal life that morally distinguishes late and early abortions:
For the woman whose child has passed the point of viability, the effort involved
to spare the life of that child is little, if at all, greater than that involved in in
ducing labor and delivering the child.[1] In earlier stages of pregnancy, say at
around four weeks, the woman who no longer wishes to carry the fetus would
have to endure approximately twenty more weeks of pregnancy, as well as
inducement and labor, to secure the independent existence of the fetus. To do
what is good is easier in the former case than in the latter, and so to fail to do
what is good in the former case is worse than to fail to do so in the latter. That
it is a less-grievous moral offense to fail in what is more difficult than in what
is less difficult clearly resonates with our moral intuitions regarding late- and
early-term abortions. (127)

As a counter-example, consider a woman who suddenly has to endure bed rest for
the last three months of pregnancy, or who is undergoing health problems in later
pregnancy. She might very well experience the remaining months of the pregnancy
as more difficult and requiring greater effort than a healthy woman does during
an entire pregnancy. Nevertheless, Peach’s general point would hold if it were
understood as defending a prima facie moral difference between early-term and
late-term abortion.
Third, Peach points out that as a pregnancy develops it becomes more and
more difficult to be inculpably ignorant of the humanity of the unborn. Early in
pregnancy, it is more plausible that the human fetus is merely a “bunch of cells” that
are not really alive, but as pregnancy progresses, fetal movement and sometimes
hiccups make such suppositions more difficult to maintain. Vivid three-dimensional
ultrasound images taken in later pregnancy make the humanity of the unborn even
harder to deny. Insofar as involuntary ignorance is, in a typical case, more likely
early than later in pregnancy, culpability will be less for early abortion than for later
abortion (135).

1
The contention that continuing pregnancy after viability requires little or no effort
outside of labor and delivery is false. After viability, much effort is involved in continuing
a pregnancy, since walking, sitting, and doing other activities typically becomes much more
challenging as the unborn child grows larger. In addition, for at least some women, morning
sickness continues even into the second and third trimesters. Still, just as carrying a load
for ten miles is more difficult than carrying it for two miles, ceteris paribus more effort is
required to finish carrying a child to term when thirty-six weeks of pregnancy remain than
when ten weeks remain.— C.K.
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Again, there may be cases when this difference is not in play. Someone well
versed in the facts of fetal development may be more culpable for having an early
abortion than a mentally handicapped woman aborting later in pregnancy. Still,
if the point is to make a prima facie case that there is greater culpability for later
abortion than for early abortion, the point remains true despite differences in cases
where other things are not equal.
Fourth, Peach argues that
when a woman first becomes aware ofthe pregnancy, the passions are most likely
to be at their highest intensity: dread of the burden of carrying the baby arises,
apprehension and anxiety at the notion of being a parent for the first time or
of having to parent another child, the fear of being financially and emotionally
abandoned by the biological father, etc. When one considers that these passions
surface all at once at the onset of pregnancy and when the developing human
being is at its earliest developmental stages—when it does not “look like a baby”
yet—then one can understand how easy it can be for a person, out of weakness
and due to difficult circumstances, to fail to apply the general prohibition against
murder to the particular case of the person in the womb. (135-136)

By contrast, to choose late-term abortion after having gotten through the initial
trauma and having withstood the stormy anxiety of learning the shocking news of
pregnancy seems to be more deliberate and therefore more blameworthy. As time
passes, passions cool and the expectation of reasonable action increases (136).
One difficulty with this argument is that it does not apply in all cases to dis
tinguish early from later abortion. In some cases of late-term abortion, the mother
may wish to terminate the pregnancy because of a diagnosis of fetal handicap that
can only be made later in pregnancy. The emotional trauma brought on by the news
of a malformed unborn child late in pregnancy may be no less severe than the dis
tress brought about by the early discovery of an unwanted pregnancy. In addition, it
can happen that a woman with irregular cycles or obesity only discovers that she is
pregnant in the second or third trimester. Still, these exceptions do not undermine
the general thesis that late-term abortion is more morally problematic than earlyterm abortion ceteris paribus.
Fifth, Peach points to the fact that, in general, expectant parents experience
late-term miscarriages as more traumatic than early miscarriages:
Even if they feel or have judged that abortion is a necessary evil, all things
considered, their sense of remorse and loss would have to be more palpable or
intense given the level of development of the child; what has been taken away
cannot plausibly be denied. This must be particularly true for the woman, whose
attachment to the person in her womb presumably develops as the child devel
ops. Just as, in general, late-term miscarriages are likely to impact a woman
(or couple) more severely than early-term ones, late-term abortions must surely
impact a woman (or couple) more severely than early-term ones. (138)

Anecdotally, it does seem to be the case that late miscarriages are more traumatic for
women (and couples) than early miscarriages. Does it follow that late abortions are
morally worse than early abortions? Does an attachment develop between the mother
and the child through the course of pregnancy such that the greater the attachment
the worse it is to detach? Generally, the length of a relationship seems to have some
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bearing on the loss involved when the relationship ends. To end a marriage after
three weeks involves a less serious loss than ending it after three decades. Perhaps
this helps explain in part why later abortion is worse than early abortion, without at
all denying that every abortion is a matter of grave, intrinsic injustice which ends
the life of an innocent human being.
Although I have raised questions about Peach’s five arguments that late abortion
is worse than early abortion in terms of circumstances and moral culpability—and
although late and early abortions are equally unjust in terms of the intentional kill
ing of innocent unborn human persons—it would seem that Peach’s arguments are
sound so long as they are understood as not being exceptionless but rather ceteris
paribus considerations.
An interesting question is why such distinctions do not find any echo in the
contemporary magisterial teaching on abortion. Would such an emphasis help or
harm evangelization toward a gospel of life? This question may also be related to the
various strategies undertaken by pro-life advocates to end abortion. Some, such as
Hadley Arkes, seek to end all abortion incrementally by focusing on issues, such as
partial-birth abortion, supported by public opinion.2 Others, most notably perhaps
Colin Harte in Changing Unjust Laws Justly: Pro-Life Solidarity with the “Last
and the Least” (2005), argue that this incremental approach is unjust and inevitably
leads to a distortion of the pro-life point of view. Peach’s analysis does not definitely
answer the question of approach, but it may prove useful in reconciling pro-lifers
divided on political strategy as well as reconciling church teaching on abortion as
intrinsically evil with the “commonsense” view of many Americans that late abor
tion is worse than early abortion.
Personhood and Rational Capacity
In his book Abortion and Unborn Human Life (1996), Patrick Lee provides
a powerful philosophical defense of the intrinsic wrongfulness of abortion. In two
recent articles in Bioethics—“The Pro-Life Argument from Sustantial Identity: A
Defence” (June 2004) and “Substantial Identity and the Right to Life: A Rejoinder to
Dean Stretton” (February 2007)—Lee defends his book and his view that all human
beings by nature have a right to life, against criticisms raised by another philosopher,
Dean Stretton.3 The exchange is crisp, clear philosophy, taking up issues such as
the difference between human beings and nonrational animals, the importance of
natural capacities in distinction from developed capacities, and responses to bizarre
examples of human brain transplants in animals and puppies with rationality. Lee’s
responses to criticism leave his case intact, but I would like to consider further one
of the points Stretton raises.

2Hadley Arkes, “This Heartbreaking Court,” First Things 166 (October 2006): 11-14.
3Dean Stretton, “The Argument from Intrinsic Value: A Critique,” Bioethics 14.3
(July 2000): 228-239, and “Essential Properties and the Right to Life: A Response to Lee,”
Bioethics 18.3 (June 2004): 264-282.
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A bizarre scenario that Dean Stretton borrows from Jeff McMahan is of dogs
with a latent brain mechanism that, with years of cognitive therapy occupying virtu
ally every waking hour, eventually allows them to function in a rational way. These
dogs would have a (weak) rational capacity, and the question is, would they also have
a right to life? If Lee answers no, these dogs do not have a right to life, then he has
in fact conceded that natural capacities do not give rise to the right to life. If Lee
answers that they do have a right to life, then he embraces an untenable conclusion
(argues Stretton) that goes against our intuitions: dogs have a right to life.
Lee responds that “it is not plausible that an animal would have a latent
capacity for rationality and self-consciousness but not manifest that capacity given
a reasonably favorable environment” (“Substantial Identity,” 95). However, bizarre
counter-examples are by their very nature not plausible. One could rule out such
examples, but they seem to be a standard tool of contemporary analytic philosophy
to, among other purposes, enable one to distinguish conceptually that which—in
reality—one finds linked up together. Lee rightly notes that the moral conclusions
we can draw from our intuitions about bizarre examples is tentative, “partly because
the scenario is so extraordinary, there is reason both to doubt what people’s intuitions
about it would be and to disagree with their intuitions if they clashed with basic
moral principles” (95).
In a certain sense, the rational puppy scenario is not that bizarre, for certain in
dividual rational animals, mentally handicapped human beings, may find themselves
in situations not altogether different from the situation of the dogs in the example.
They may be able to function rationally only if a massive effort is made by those
around them to give them what other human beings can attain effortlessly. Unless
Stretton would deny the right to life to human beings with serious mental handicaps,
then it would seem that the dogs in question would also have a right to life. “If the
dogs really did have a basic, natural capacity for conceptual thought and free choice,
but (inexplicably) could actualize that capacity only through gargantuan efforts,
why should this last fact determine whether or not they are intrinsically valuable as
subjects of rights?” (95). Of course, if dogs, cats, or horses really were rational, then
it would turn out that they are radically different creatures than we had previously
thought. It might be appropriate to rename them, snoopies or garfields or mistereds,
or perhaps even more appropriately to have them name themselves. Further, just
because someone can recover a natural capacity with a gargantuan effort, it does
not follow that such an effort must be made. Similarly, life is always a good, but
we need not do everything in our power, no matter what the circumstances and no
matter what the cost, to preserve human life.
Cell Growth and Potentiality
In an article titled “Individuality and Human Beginnings: A Reply to David
DeGrazia,” Alfonso Gomez-Lobo of Georgetown University and the President’s
Council on Bioethics brings important considerations to bear on criticisms of the
proposition that “we originate as single-cell zygotes at the time of conception” (Jour
nal o f Law, Medicine & Ethics, Fall 2007, 457). A standard objection to this view is
that fact that a zygote can twin, and therefore (it is argued) must not have been an
165
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individual at the time of conception, but rather a “mass of tissue” from which could
arise several individuals. Of course, if there is no individual present, then there is no
“person” according to the classic Boethian definition of a person as an individual
substance of a rational nature.4
Gomez-Lobo shows that there is no necessary link between indivisibility and
individuality, noting that “If indivisibility were a necessary condition for individu
ality, then there would be no material individuals. After all, any material object
can be pulled apart of dismantled. No car would be an individual car, but only a
collection or package of car parts, likewise no living body would be an individual
organism, but only a colony of cells” (458). Obviously then, individuality does not
require indivisibility.
What if we slightly change the necessary condition and say that “if a living or
ganism can give rise to other living organisms by fission,” then it is not an individual?
Gomez-Lobo responds, “On the assumed criterion you could never have, say, three
individual amoebas on a lab dish because each of them can divide and reproduce
by fission. Nor could you have six because the ones resulting from the division can
in turn be divided, etc. In the case of amoebas, we cannot even have recourse to the
alternative that they are a mere collection of cells: amoebas are single-cell organisms”
(458). Thus, the ability to give rise to others by means of fission does not exclude
individuality, unless one wants to say, rather implausibly, that there is no such thing
as an individual amoeba, no such thing as three amoebas, etc.
Another argument examined by Gomez-Lobo is that with cloning any cell
of the human body has the potential to become a full grown human being, and so
the fact that the zygote has potential to develop into a mature human being makes
it no more important—on that account—than any skin or hair cell. Every cell in
the human body has the potential (through cloning) to become a full grown human
being, but obviously every human cell does not have an inalienable right to life. So
too, the zygote does not have an inalienable right to life based on its potentiality to
become a mature human being.
Gomez-Lobo indicates a difficulty with this view:
It is plainly false that each somatic cell has the potential to become an organism.
In terms of its epigenetic state, each of those cells is at an end-stage or unipotent
state. The technician performing the cloning extracts a nucleus (thereby destroy
ing the original somatic cell and any potentiality it may have had) and inserts it
in an enucleated ovum. The expectation is that the cytoplasm of the ovum will
reprogram that nucleus so that it reverts to zygote stage. Not the original somatic
cell, but the new cell, the one that starts to live with the reprogrammed nucleus
directing the genetic development of the material provided by the ovum, is the
one that has the potentiality to generate a full-grown organism. (461)

This critique depends on what constitutes a cell, for one might respond (contrary to
the standard view that the nucleus is a part of a cell) that the “cell” is essentially the

4
David DeGrazia, “Moral Status, Human Identity, and Early Embryos: A Critique of
the President’s Approach,” Journal o f Law, Medicine & Ethics 34.1 (Spring 2006): 49-57.
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nucleus, with other parts such as the cell membrane, mitochondria, and cytoplasm
being merely accidental properties like hair on a human being. Contemporary phi
losophy is rife with competing accounts of what essentially constitutes a human be
ing—brain alone, body and brain, soul and body, etc., and these discussions could in
principle be mirrored by similar debates about what constitutes a cell. Gomez-Lobo’s
critique works given standard accounts of the nature of a cell, but one could imagine
critiques of the standard account as philosophically naive (although I am aware of
no such discussion in the philosophy of biology). Such a response to Gomez-Lobo’s
argument seems quite strained, to say the least.
In a sense, the argument from potentiality is misplaced. The standard pro-life
position does not hinge on the potentiality of the embryo, fetus, or baby to become
a functionally rational adult or, in DeGrazia’s words, “one of us.” The typical pro
life view is that any human being in any stage of development—embryonic, fetal,
or infantile—is already in its actual nature a rational animal, not potentially but
already “one of us.” So arguments about whether a skin cell has potential to become
one of us are irrelevant. No one argues that a skin cell is actually “one of us,” for it
is merely a part of an individual. The real argument is about whether all human be
ings in whatever stage of development count as “one of us” in terms of basic human
rights, or only those who meet a certain standard of functioning.
Christopher K aczor , Ph .D.
The Catholic University of America
Washington, D.C.
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